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In this paper, we propose a novel account of desire reports, i.e. sen-
tences of the form pS wants pq. Our theory is partly motivated by
Phillips-Brown’s (2021) observation that subjects can desire things
even if those things aren’t best by the subject’s lights. That is, being
best isn’t necessary for being desired. We compare our proposal to ex-
isting theories, and show that it provides a neat account of the central
phenomenon.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we propose a novel account of desire reports, i.e. sentences of
the form pS wants pq. Our theory is partly motivated by some striking ob-
servations presented by Phillips-Brown (2021). In particular, Phillips-Brown
observes that subjects can desire things even if those things aren’t best by
the subject’s lights. That is, being best isn’t necessary for being desired. To
illustrate, Phillips-Brown discusses scenarios such as the following:
Tickets: You will be given a single ticket from a hat. Most of
the tickets are worthless. Two tickets, though, have cash value,
the blue ticket (worth $100) and the red ticket (worth $50).
(1) a. I want to get the red ticket.
b. I want to get the blue ticket.
Both (1a) and (1b) are acceptable here. In particular, (1a) sounds true,
even though getting the red ticket clearly isn’t the best outcome.1
*To appear in Philosophical Studies. Thanks to Simon Goldstein and Milo Phillips-
Brown for helpful discussion. And special thanks to the reviewers at Philosophical Studies
for their thoughtful comments.
1Here is another way to bring out that what’s best isn’t necessary for being desired.
Suppose your favorite type of pasta is spaghetti bolognese, with lasagna a close second.
You’re late for dinner, so your friend orders for you. As you sit down, the waiter brings
you a plate of lasagna. If your friend points to the food and asks ‘Did you want that?’,
you can perfectly well say ‘Yes’. But lasagna isn’t best by your lights.
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Phillips-Brown argues that some prominent analyses of desire do not al-
low (1a) to be true in context. More generally, these accounts do not
allow subjects to want what isn’t best. Phillips-Brown then develops a
decision-theoretic semantics for desire reports—what we call thresholdism—
that does.2 In what follows, we raise some concerns for thresholdism, and
propose an account of our own.
We maintain that desire reports have two important aspects. First, they are
alternative-sensitive. This means that the objects relevant for the evaluation
of a desire report is a set of propositions, called alternatives; and whether
S wants p doesn’t just depend on the content of p alone, but also on which
alternatives are relevant in context. Second, we maintain that desire reports
existentially quantify over alternatives in the following sense: pS wants pq is
true just in case there is some p-entailing alternative that is “good” by the
subject’s lights.3 This explains why, for instance, (1a) is true: the alternative
on which you get the red ticket is still a good outcome, even though getting
the blue ticket is better. Not only does this account allow subjects to want
what isn’t best, but, as we will show, it also improves on thresholdism in
several respects.
Our discussion is structured as follows. In §2 we outline Phillips-Brown’s
criticism of dominant approaches to desire, and present thresholdism. Then
in §3 we argue that thresholdism predicts that some unacceptable conjunc-
tions involving desire reports should be true; and show that it invalidates
an intuitively plausible principle in the logic of desire. In §4 we develop our
positive proposal, and explain how it satisfies our desiderata. Finally, §5
concludes.
2 Thresholdism
In this section, we outline Phillips-Brown’s criticism of existing analyses of
desire (§2.1), and then present thresholdism (§2.2).
2We will follow Phillips-Brown in assuming that ‘want’ in its most fundamental use
expresses a propositional attitude. Some have questioned this assumption (Montague,
2007; Grzankowski, 2016). We expect that our main ideas could be readily adapted to a
non-propositional approach.
3We let ‘S’ range over the names of agents and let ‘S ’ range over the corresponding
agents denoted by ‘S’. Similarly, we let ‘p’ range over the logical forms of proposition-
denoting strings and let ‘p’ range over the corresponding propositions denoted by ‘p’.
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2.1 Wanting and what’s best
Existing analyses of desire typically connect the desirability of a thing to that
thing being best among the relevant alternatives.4 As mentioned, Phillips-
Brown poses a problem for such analyses by arguing that being best isn’t
necessary for being desired. To make Phillips-Brown’s criticism clear, it will
be helpful to have an account of desire on the table. To this end, we briefly
present a popular ordering-based semantics for desire reports.
Ordering-based accounts of desire involve two main elements: (i) a domain
of worlds, or modal base B5, and (ii) a subjective ordering >S,w over the
worlds in B.6 The idea is that w′ >S,w w′′ when w′ is more desirable to S
(in w) than w′′.7 >S,w is taken to be a strict partial order. The desirability
of a proposition is measured by considering the top-ranked worlds in B, as
ordered by >S,w (von Fintel, 1999; Crnič, 2011; Rubinstein, 2012). To make
this a bit more precise, let us introduce a function best that takes a subject
S, modal base B, and subjective ordering >S,w and yields the set of top-
ranked worlds in B, as ordered by >S,w. Then the ordering-based account
can be expressed as follows:
Ordering-based semantics for want
pS wants pq is true relative to 〈w,B〉 iff best ⊆ p.
So, for instance, ‘I want to order lasagna’ is true just in case all of the best
worlds, by my lights, are ordering-lasagna-worlds.
Now recall (1a) and (1b) in the Tickets scenario:
(1) a. I want to get the red ticket.
b. I want to get the blue ticket.
Intuitively, both reports are true in context. However, the problem is that
for any (non-empty) modal base B: if (1b) is true relative to B on the
ordering-based semantics, then (1a) will be false relative to B. For instance,
4The notion of “being best among the relevant alternatives” can be spelled out in
various ways. We consider one common approach below. See fn.11 for another.
5The term “modal base” is often used ambiguously in the literature: sometimes it is
used to mean the set of propositions that are intersected to determine the modal domain
(or the function from worlds to such sets), while other times it is used to mean the modal
domain itself. We use it in the second way here.
6B is often identified with the set of worlds compatible with what the subject believes
(Heim, 1992; von Fintel, 1999). As we discuss in §4.1, there is reason to think that this
identification is problematic, so we opt for a less committal statement of the view here.
7We will often drop the world subscript on preference orderings when no confusion
arises.
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suppose B = {wR, wB, wN}, where wR is a world where I get the red ticket,
wB is a world where I get the blue ticket, and wN is a world where I get
neither the red nor blue ticket. My preference ordering over these worlds
looks as follows: wB >Me wR >Me wN. Thus, best = {wB}. But then
although (1b) will be true, (1a) will be false.
As far as we can see, the only possible response here is to appeal to a shift
in the modal base.8 The idea would be that (1b) is true because, e.g., the
report is evaluated relative to B from above. And (1a) is true because the
best worlds in the modal base relative to which this report is evaluated are
red-ticket worlds, e.g. the modal base could be B′ = {wR, wN}. Although
Phillips-Brown doesn’t discuss this reply, we see at least two reasons to be
unsatisfied with it. For one thing, conjunctions such as (2) seem perfectly
felicitous, and don’t induce the kind of “double take” effects that usually
come with context shifts.
(2) I want to get the red ticket and I want to get the blue ticket.
Moreover, if someone asked the question in (3a), it would be acceptable to
answer as in (3b):
(3) a. How many tickets are ones you want to be drawn?
b. Two.
But relative to the candidate modal bases, only one ticket will be best.9,10
8As Phillips-Brown points out, trying to explain how both reports can be true by
appealing to a shift in the preference ordering over worlds is problematic, since the only
thing I value here is money.
9Phillips-Brown also denies that being best is sufficient for being wanted. His argument
against this claim ultimately comes down to cases such as the following:
Depressive: Suppose that you are deeply, deeply depressed. There is nothing
at all in the whole world that you want. Life is misery. Even so, you do
prefer some things to others. Something is best, but nothing is wanted.
The idea is that if you are such a depressive, then even if you prefer some options to
others, pYou want pq is false for any p. If it is coherent to suppose that such an individual
exists, then this poses a problem for the ordering-based account, no matter which worlds
appear in the modal base.
We find cases such as Depressive fairly tendentious (after all, it’s fairly strange to say
something like ‘I prefer getting spaghetti most of all, but I don’t want to get spaghetti’).
More generally, our sense is that the case against the sufficiency of being best for being
desired is weaker than the case against the necessity of being best for being desired. Con-
sequently, we focus on the latter here, and remain neutral about the status of sufficiency
(but see fn.24 for how a rejection of sufficiency could be captured on our positive proposal).
10It is worth noting that the analogue of (1a) with ‘hope’—‘I hope to get the red
ticket’—sounds much worse in the Tickets scenario. Similarly with ‘wish’: ‘I wish I had
gotten the red ticket’ is infelicitous if you find out that you were given, for example, the
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2.2 Threshold semantics
In response to scenarios such as Tickets, Phillips-Brown develops a novel
decision-theoretic account of desire, which we will call thresholdism.11 On
this semantics, pS wants pq is true just in case the expected value of p, for
S, exceeds a contextually determined threshold value t. The expected value
of p for S is the utility of p for S weighted by S’s subjective probabilities
(Jeffrey, 1965). To make this account more precise, let Cw,S represent S’s
credences over the live possibilities in w. Also, let vw,S be an evaluation
function, i.e. a function from W to the real numbers. Intuitively, vw,S(w
′)
measures how much utility S would get if w′ was the actual world. Then
thresholdism can be represented as follows:12
Threshold semantics for want





′) · Cw,S(w′|p) > t
This account explains the fact that being best isn’t necessary for being
wanted by maintaining that the threshold value is set sufficiently low in
context. For instance, in the Tickets scenario, let us suppose that there are
a total of ten tickets in the hat. Then your credences/utilities are as follows:
green ticket. Moreover, the only appropriate answer to the questions ‘How many tickets
are ones you hope will be drawn?’ and ‘How many tickets are ones you wish had been
drawn?’ in these scenarios is ‘One’. More generally, in contrast to wanting, one cannot
hope or wish for what isn’t best. See (Blumberg & Hawthorne, forthcoming) for a detailed
discussion of these features of hoping, among others, and (Blumberg, 2018) for an analysis
of wish reports.
11Decision-theoretic accounts of desire are also endorsed by (van Rooij, 1999; Lassiter,
2011; Jerzak, 2019). Existing decision-theoretic analyses also typically maintain that being
best among the relevant alternatives is necessary (and sufficient) for being desired. For
instance, on Levinson’s account, pS wants pq is true just in case p has higher expected
value than ¬p. The relevant alternatives here are the propositions p and ¬p, and the “best”
proposition is that which has highest expected value. It is worth noting that Levinson’s
proposal predicts that (1a) (‘I want to get the red ticket’) is true in the Tickets scenario
(so this example does not support thresholdism over Levinson’s account). However, his
account also predicts that there should be no scenarios where although some outcomes
are preferred to others, every outcome is good and therefore wanted. But such cases seem
to obtain, e.g. if every dish on the menu looks good, I can truly assert ‘I want everything
on the menu’. Moreover, the problems that we raise for thresholdism in §3 also arise for
Levinson’s theory. Finally, if one was convinced that being best isn’t sufficient for being
desired, then Levinson’s account would be problematic, e.g. it cannot capture cases such
as Depressive of fn.9.
12Technically, on the variant of thresholdism developed by Phillips-Brown the threshold
is fixed by a contextually determined function from world-agent pairs to real numbers
(15-18), rather than directly by context. But this machinery is only needed to handle
embedded desire reports, which we do not consider here. Presenting things as we have














Then EVYou(Red) = 50, and EVYou(Blue) = 100. Even though
EVYou(Blue) > EVYou(Red), so long as the threshold t is below 50, both
(1a) (‘I want to get the red ticket’) and (1b) (‘I want to get the blue ticket’)
are predicted to be true.
Overall, thresholdism is able to capture the central examples in a fairly
elegant fashion. However, we think that there are some problems with this
account, which we turn to next.
3 Two concerns
We raise two issues for Phillips-Brown’s threshold semantics. First, it pre-
dicts that some unacceptable conjunctions involving desire reports should
be true (§3.1). Second, it invalidates an intuitively plausible principle in the
logic of desire (§3.2).
3.1 Abominable Conjunctions
On the threshold semantics, desire reports fail to be closed under logical
consequence, i.e. Monotonicity is not valid on this account:
Monotonicity If p |= q, then S wants p |= S wants q
To illustrate, consider the following example:
Dinner : I’m meeting my friend for dinner. There are three
items on the menu: spaghetti bolognese, chicken, and lasagna.
I’m going to be late, so my friend—who has no idea about my
preferences—is going to order for me. Given my past experience,
I like the spaghetti most, I find the chicken to be good, and I















Then EVMe(Spaghetti) = 100, and EVMe(Pasta) =
EVMe(Spaghetti or lasagna) = −25. Thus, so long as the threshold t
is above -25, (4a) is predicted to be true, and (4b) is predicted to be false.
But of course I get spaghetti entails I get pasta.
(4) a. I want spaghetti.
b. I want pasta.
Now, von Fintel (1999, 120) raises a challenge for approaches to desire that
reject monotonicity.13 The central observation is that conjunctions such as
(5) are unacceptable (as indicated by the ‘#’ preceding the example):
(5) # I want spaghetti, but I don’t want pasta.
It is difficult to access an acceptable interpretation of (5); the conjunction
sounds incoherent, almost as if the speaker is contradicting themselves.14
This is surprising if (4a) is true and (4b) is false—why can’t one felicitously
conjoin them as in (5)? It’s unclear.15
13This argument is also endorsed by Crnič (2011) and Pasternak (2019).
14Some might be tempted to respond by appealing to the so-called “neg-raising” prop-
erties of ‘want’ i.e. the phenomenon whereby negated want reports are interpreted with
negation taking narrow scope with respect to ‘want’ (Collins & Postal, 2014). However,
it is generally assumed that the negation ‘it’s not that’ resists neg-raising, and yet (6) is
just as unacceptable as (5):
(6) # I want spaghetti, but it’s not that I want pasta.
Moreover, ‘I want to not get pasta’ is predicted to be true on thresholdism so long as
the threshold is below 50. So, neg-raising doesn’t provide us with a good explanation for
the badness of (5).
15We explore the various data points around monotonicity and abominable conjunctions




Our second concern with thresholdism involves the rule we’ll call Weakening,
after an analogous principle in deontic logic discussed by Cariani (2016):
Weakening S wants p,S wants q |= S wants p or q
As far as we can tell, Weakening is an entirely uncontroversial principle in the
logic of desire. The pattern it exhibits is eminently plausible, and we know
of no purported counterexamples in the literature. However, thresholdism
renders it invalid. To see this, let us focus on the following scenario:
Party Time: Bill has been invited to a party, and he knows that
Ann and Carol have been invited too. When Ann and Carol are
together they’re funny, charming and tell great stories. But if
one attends without the other, the person attending always ends
up being a real bore, and inevitably makes the party worse for
everyone else.

















A routine calculation confirms that EVBill(Ann attends) =
EVBill(Carol attends) = 25, but EVBill(Ann or Carol attend) = 0. Thus, so
long as the threshold is set between 0 and 25, thresholdism predicts that
(7a) and (7b) should be true, but (7c) should be false.
16This countermodel to Weakening is inspired by a similar countermodel provided by
Cariani (2016) against certain decision-theoretic analyses of deontic modals.
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(7) a. Bill wants Ann to attend.
b. Bill wants Carol to attend.
c. Bill wants Ann or Carol to attend.
But as far as we can tell, there are simply no contexts where one could
appropriately assert something like ‘Bill wants Ann to attend, and he wants
Carol to attend, but it’s not that he wants Ann or Carol to attend’. Such
speeches seem incoherent.
What could be said in response? As far as we can see, the only possible reply
is to maintain that although Weakening isn’t strictly valid, the most natural
contexts ensure that (7a) and (7b) pattern with (7c). More specifically, it
would have to be maintained that in these contexts, the threshold value t is
fixed so that if (7a) and (7b) are true, then (7c) is true as well. However,
a fair amount of work would need to be done in order to run this argument
successfully. For one thing, the meta-semantic question of how exactly the
threshold gets fixed in context would need to be addressed; and then the
requisite property of contexts would need to be isolated and independently
motivated. These tasks seem non-trivial. At the very least, we have sufficient
motivation to develop a different style of approach that allows us to capture
Weakening more straightforwardly.
To sum up our discussion thus far: what we require is an analysis on which
(i) being best isn’t necessary for being desired, (ii) abominable conjunctions
are not predicted to be acceptable, and (iii) Weakening is valid. We try to
develop such a proposal in the next section.
4 Alternative-sensitive semantics
We present our positive approach in several stages. First, we provide a basic
entry that captures some of the central features of our account (§4.1). Then
we propose a constraint that governs the relationship between the prejacent
of want reports and the set of possibilities relevant for the evaluation of these
ascriptions (§4.2). Finally, we discuss some concerns involving disjunctions
in the scope of desire reports (§4.3), and reports which feature internal
negation (§4.4).
4.1 The basic proposal
Like the ordering-based analysis presented in §2.1, we also propose that
desire reports are evaluated relative to a domain of objects. However, one
of the key features of our account is that we take this to be a domain of
propositions rather than worlds. There are several ways of developing this
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idea, but we will implement it in a fairly simple way so as not to distract
from our central arguments.
We will say thatA is a set of alternatives if it is a set of pairwise incompatible
propositions. So, if A,B ∈ A, then A∩B = ∅. To illustrate, let ann, mary,
pete, and sue represent the propositions that Ann wins the race, Mary
wins the race, Pete wins the race, and Sue wins the race, respectively. Then
A1 = {ann, mary, pete, sue} is a set of alternatives. We propose that
the set of objects that is relevant for the evaluation of a desire ascription pS
wants pq is a set of contextually supplied alternatives.17
Given a set of alternatives A and a world w, GA,w(·) is what we will call a
good-selecting function from individuals to subsets ofA. Intuitively, GA,w(S)
represents the set of “good” alternatives in A for S at w.18 Correspondingly,
the complement of GA,w(S) with respect to A (A−GA,w(S)) represents the
set of alternatives that are “not good” for S.19 For instance, if Ann and
Mary are Bill’s friends, and Pete and Sue are Bill’s enemies, then GA1(Bill) =
{ann,mary}.20 We propose that desire reports are evaluated relative to a
contextually determined good-selecting function.
Our first-pass account can be expressed as follows:
Account 1
pS wants pq is true relative to 〈w,A,G〉 iff for some q ∈ GA,w(S):
q ⊆ p
In short, pS wants pq is true just in case some good alternative entails p. It is
worth pointing out that an analogous account that existentially quantified
over individual worlds would be a non-starter. For instance, consider a
variant of the entry considered in §2.1 on which pS wants pq is true just
in case there is some top-ranked p-world in best. This would predict that
subjects want anything that is merely compatible with their desires, e.g.
that ‘I want ten people in Germany to wear yellow tomorrow’ should be true.
But this is clearly problematic. By contrast, since Account 1 quantifies over
propositions, rather than worlds, this issue doesn’t arise.
17One might want to allow the set of alternatives to vary from world to world. One
could capture this by maintaining that interpretation proceeds relative to a function from
worlds to sets of alternatives, rather than just a set of alternatives. But we’ll ignore this
complication in what follows.
18If you were a “doxastic cognitivist” in the sense of (Dietz, 2020) you might think that
the goodness of an alternative has to do with the agent believing the alternative has some
special property, and then somehow try to explain desire in terms of beliefs of this kind.
We wish to be agnostic about cognitivism here.
19The alternatives in A− GA,w(S) needn’t be bad for S, they just aren’t good.
20We will often drop the world subscript on the good-selecting function when no confu-
sion arises.
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To get a feel for how Account 1 works, consider the following example
adapted from Levinson (2003):
Insurance: Sue is deciding whether to take out house insurance.
She estimates that the chances of her house burning down are
1
1000 . But the results would be calamitous: she’d lose her home
which is valued at $1, 000, 000. Comprehensive home insurance
would cost her $100. Sue has a meeting with her insurance broker
this afternoon, so she needs to decide what she wants to do.
(8) Sue wants to buy insurance.
If Sue is like most of us, (8) is true: even though she thinks it’s likely that
her house won’t burn down, there is a small possibility that it does, and the
badness of this possibility outweighs the cost of buying insurance.
Examples such as (8) are often taken to pose a problem for accounts that
ground the semantic value of desire reports in preference orderings over
worlds, e.g. the ordering-based analysis considered in §2.1. Given such an
ordering over worlds, the problem is that in order to make (8) come out
true, it must be claimed that Sue’s most preferred worlds are ones where
she buys insurance. But intuitively this isn’t the case; it’s quite clear that
Sue most prefers worlds where she spends no money on insurance (and
there’s no fire).21 However, alternatives are relatively coarse-grained enti-
ties. So, even if there are some worlds in an alternative B that are bad
by S’s lights, S can still consider B to be good overall. For instance, let
us suppose that the relevant set of alternatives in the Insurance scenario is
21As far as we’re aware, this argument was first put forward by Levinson (2003). It has
been endorsed by Lassiter (2011) and Jerzak (2019).
It might be argued that the ordering-based analysis does actually predict that (8) should
be true, once one takes peace of mind into account: in worlds where Sue buys insurance,
Sue’s peace of mind has greater utility than the cost of insurance (Büring, 2003; von
Fintel, 2012). However, we can control for this aspect of the case by considering a similar
scenario where Sue never finds out whether insurance is purchased:
Trip: Sue is going on a cross-country trip. As a favor to Sue, Bill agreed to
organize the car rental. She estimates that the chances of the car being in
an accident are 1
1000
. But the results would be very bad: she’d have to pay
for the cost of repairs which will be at least $10, 000. Comprehensive car
insurance costs $100. Sue won’t be able to find out from Bill if he purchases
insurance—he’s at a meditation retreat for the duration of her trip, and
personal calls are not allowed.
(9) Sue wants Bill to buy insurance.
(9) is true here, but Sue won’t find out if insurance is bought, and so won’t get peace
of mind from the purchase.
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A = {insurance, insurance}, where insurance and insurance are the
propositions that Sue buys insurance, and that she doesn’t buy insurance,
respectively. Moreover, let us suppose that the only good alternative ac-
cording to Sue is insurance, i.e. GA(Sue) = {insurance}. In this case,
Account 1 predicts that (8) should be true.
At this point, two natural meta-semantic questions arise for Account 1: (i)
how exactly does the set of alternatives A get determined in context, and
(ii) how are the good alternatives GA(S) selected from A. We won’t be able
to provide a complete answer to the first question here. This is obviously an
important topic, and our account won’t be complete without a predictive
theory of how this parameter gets fixed. That said, it is worth remarking
that variants of this meta-semantic challenge arise for virtually all existing
accounts of desire. This is because what a subject desires is usually analyzed
as involving a background collection of possibilities. The general form of the
meta-semantic question, then, is this: how exactly do these possibilities get
determined in context? To make this point a bit more concrete, consider
the popular ordering-based theory from §2.1. As mentioned in fn.6, it is
common for theorists to identify this modal base with the subject’s belief
set (Heim, 1992; von Fintel, 1999). In some contexts, this seems plausible
enough. For instance, when I’m ordering a sandwich, ‘I want the ham and
cheese’ can be true even if what I most desire, e.g. lobster, goes beyond
what I believe I can get. On the other hand, it has been recognized for some
time (though it is often ignored) that subjects can want things that they
believe (and in some cases are certain) won’t obtain:
(10) a. I want this weekend to last forever (but of course I know it will
be over in a few hours) (Heim, 1992, 199).
b. Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won’t be) [(Grano &
Phillips-Brown, 2020) inspired by (Portner & Rubinstein, 2012)].
Clearly, in these cases what is desired is not constrained by what the subject
believes or knows.22 Why, then, is the modal base sometimes restricted to
what the subject believes—as in the sandwich case—and sometimes not—
as in (10a)? In other words, what fixes the modal base in context? This
question is analogous to asking what, given our account, determines the
background set of alternatives. Of course, the fact that this meta-semantic
challenge arises for a broad range of accounts doesn’t make trying to answer
it any less important. But it is still worth registering that the issue is quite
a general one.
22By contrast, such constraints seem to be operative in the case of hoping. For instance,
as Blumberg & Hawthorne (forthcoming) observe, the analogues of the examples in (10)
with ‘hope’ sound much worse.
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As for the second question concerning how GA(S) is fixed, one model that
we’re attracted to is that it is determined by expected value. We can make
this precise by following Phillips-Brown and supposing that context deter-
mines a threshold value t. Then where A is an alternative: A ∈ GA(S) when
EVS(A) > t. Supposing t < EVSue(insurance) in the Insurance scenario,
this would explain why insurance ∈ GA(Sue). If that’s correct, then this
has interesting consequences for the nature of desire. Theories that analyze
desire in terms of subjective preference orderings, and decision-theoretic
analyses that tie the desirability of a proposition to its expected value are
often taken to be in competition with each other (Lassiter, 2011; von Fintel,
2012). However, if the ordering over alternatives is essentially determined
by expected value, then this isn’t the case. In order to adequately model
the structure of desiderative attitudes, the central elements of both accounts
are needed.23 We will come back to this point in §5.
Now let us return to our central desiderata. First, we want to be able to
capture the fact that being best isn’t necessary for being desired. Recall the
Tickets case from above:
Tickets: You will be given a single ticket from a hat. Most of
the tickets are worthless. Two tickets, though, have cash value,
the blue ticket (worth $100) and the red ticket (worth $50).
(1) a. I want to get the red ticket.
b. I want to get the blue ticket.
Let us suppose that the relevant set of alternatives here is A =
{red,blue,other}, where red is the proposition that you get the red
ticket, blue is the proposition that you get the blue ticket, and other is
the proposition that you get a different color ticket. Then so long as both
red and blue are considered good, i.e. {red,blue} ⊆ GA(Me), both (1a)
and (1b) are predicted to be true. In particular, even if red isn’t best, it
can still be wanted.24
As for abominable conjunctions, we saw that (5) is unacceptable in the
Dinner scenario:
23We use expected value because it is fairly simple, and allows us to fix ideas. We
want to leave it open that the “good news value” of an outcome is better represented by
using expected value in more sophisticated ways, or even by adopting a more sophisticated
decision theory, e.g. prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1988) or risk-weighted utility
theory (Buchak, 2013). Note moreover that even if the relevant notion of goodness isn’t
ultimately cashed out in decision-theoretic terms, the central tenets of our account remain
unaffected.
24For those who think that being best is not sufficient for being desired, our account can
accommodate this if we assume that the set of good alternatives can be empty in context,
i.e. GA(S) = ∅.
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Dinner : I’m meeting my friend for dinner. There are three
items on the menu: spaghetti bolognese, chicken, and lasagna.
I’m going to be late, so my friend—who has no idea about my
preferences—is going to order for me. Given my past experience,
I like the spaghetti most, I find the chicken to be good, and I
hate the lasagna.
(5) # I want spaghetti, but I don’t want pasta.
This is easily explained by our account. Let us suppose that the relevant set
of alternatives is A = {spaghetti,chicken, lasagna}, with GA(Me) =
{spaghetti,chicken}. Then the second conjunct in (5) can’t be true,
since there is some good pasta-entailing alternative, namely spaghetti.
And indeed, (5) is predicted be infelicitous for any value of GA(Me).
Finally, it is simple to check that Weakening (repeated below) is valid.
Weakening S wants p,S wants q |= S wants p or q
If pS wants pq is true, then there is some p-entailing alternative A ∈ A such
that A ∈ GA(S). But p entails p ∨ q, and so there is some p ∨ q-entailing
alternative in GA(S). Thus, pS wants p or qq is true.
In terms of our primary aims, Account 1 provides us with what we want.
However, as we’ll see, the entry needs some refinement.
4.2 Representation
Account 1 captures some of the key ideas behind our proposal. But the entry
needs to be amended. The problem is that it doesn’t sufficiently constrain
the relationship that holds between the propositional argument to ‘want’
and the background set of alternatives A. For instance, it predicts that the
clearly unacceptable (11) should be true in Tickets:
(11) # I don’t want to get the blue ticket and inherit a Ferrari.
This is because no alternative in A = {red,blue,other} entails that I get
the blue ticket and inherit a Ferrari. Consequently, no good alternative in
the set entails this proposition, and so (11) is true.
Intuitively, what goes wrong with (11) is that the proposition I get the
blue ticket and inherit a Ferrari makes salient certain distinctions that are
being ignored by the background set of alternatives. We can make this
more precise through the following definition. Given a set of alternatives A
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and proposition p, let us say that p is represented by A just in case every
alternative in A either entails p or entails ¬p.25
We propose adding a representation requirement to the semantics of desire
reports. More precisely, we will include this as a definedness condition on de-
sire ascriptions. This explains why (11) is unacceptable in context: presup-
positions are known to project through negation (Chierchia & McConnell-
Ginet, 2000), so (11) also requires that I get the blue ticket and inherit a
Ferrari be represented by the background set of alternatives. However, red
neither entails I get the blue ticket and inherit a Ferrari nor its negation.
Thus, (11) is predicted to suffer from presupposition failure, and thus be
unacceptable. Our final entry for ‘want’ then looks as follows:26,27
Alternative-sensitive semantics for want
pS wants pq is defined relative to 〈w,A,G〉 only if p is represented
by A
If defined, pS wants pq is true relative to 〈w,A,G〉 iff for some
q ∈ GA,w(S): q ⊆ p
Note that Weakening is still valid on this entry. To see this, it suffices
to observe that if both p and q are represented by A, then p ∨ q must
be represented as well. For suppose otherwise. Then there must be an
alternative A ∈ A that includes ¬p-worlds and ¬q-worlds along with p-
worlds and q-worlds. But this contradicts both p and q being represented.28
25Cf. Cariani’s (2013) notion of a proposition being “visible” with respect to a back-
ground partition of logical space.
26For convenience, we assume that presupposition failure has a semantic effect. But
our general approach is compatible with pragmatic accounts of presupposition on which
presupposition failure affects assertability rather than semantic value (Schlenker, 2009).
27(12) can be heard as true:
(12) I want to get the blue ticket and inherit a Ferrari.
We can explain this if we take on board the following widely accepted principle: hearers
tend to interpret sentences so as to avoid presupposition failure. That is, within reasonable
limits, hearers will make the assumptions necessary to avoid undefinedness. (This process
is usually discussed under the heading “accommodation”. The basic phenomenon goes
back at least to Kartunnen (1974). See (von Fintel, 2004) for a more recent discussion.)
For instance, even if I suspect that you have no siblings, I will come to assume that you
have a sister once I’ve heard you utter ‘I have to fetch my sister from the airport tomorrow’.
That is, the presupposition triggered by the possessive ‘my sister’, namely that I have a
sister, is taken to hold when evaluating my utterance. Similarly, when hearers interpret
(12) as true, they are shifting to a set of alternatives on which I get the blue ticket and
inherit a Ferrari is represented. And relative to such a set, it is plausible that at least
one good alternative entails I get the blue ticket and inherit a Ferrari, in which case (12)
should be true. Note that relative to such a set (11) will be false, and so will still be
predicted to be unacceptable.
28Note that monotonicity isn’t classically valid on this entry, but is only “Strawson
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With our final account at hand, we want to bring out an important structural
difference between our approach and thresholdism. In short, thresholdism
makes the semantic value of desire reports overly sensitive to utility and
probability assignments. To see this, consider the following scenario:
Trip: You have won a trip abroad. Assuming that you are
granted the relevant visa, you will either be flown to Paris, Berlin,
or Rio de Janeiro. You most desire visiting Paris, and you are
indifferent between Berlin and Rio. More specifically, your cre-













EVYou(Paris) = 100, and EVYou(Europe) = 75. Let us suppose that the
threshold is set at 70. Then thresholdism predicts that both (13a) and
(13b) should be true:
(13) a. I want to visit Paris.
b. I want to visit Europe.
Similarly, supposing that the relevant alternatives are A =
{paris,berlin,rio}, and that GA(You) = {paris}, our alternative-
sensitive account also predicts that both of these reports should be
true.
However, thresholdism predicts that (13b) should start to sound unaccept-
able as either (i) the utility of visiting Berlin decreases, or (ii) the probability
of going to Berlin increases relative to Paris. For instance, suppose that the
utility of visiting Berlin is lowered to 30. Then (13b) is predicted to be
false. However, to our ears the report still sounds just as acceptable as in
the original scenario. Similarly, suppose that the probability of going to Rio
valid” (von Fintel, 1999). But this doesn’t affect our predictions about conjunctions such
as (5): these will either be false or undefined on any set of alternatives.
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decreases to 1/6, and the probability of going to Berlin increases to 1/2.
Then (13b) is predicted to be false. But again, the report still sounds just
as good as in the original scenario.29 Indeed, thresholdism predicts that if
my credence that I’ll go to Berlin increases (suppose I come to learn that
Germany has relaxed some of their visa requirements), then (14) should be
true:
(14) # I wanted to visit Europe, but I don’t anymore.
However, (14) is unacceptable: these sorts of changes in what I desire don’t
seem to be justified by shifts in my credence of going to Berlin.30
The more general problem here is that on thresholdism, the semantic value
of pS wants pq is directly tied to the expected value of the prejacent p. By
contrast, on our account the role that expected value plays is more indirect:
it just determines which alternatives are good or not good; the expected
value of the prejacent isn’t relevant. Thus, even if the utility or probability
of going to Berlin changes, this doesn’t affect the fact that going to Paris
is a good alternative. So, even if the utility/probability of going to Berlin
changes, we still predict that (13b) should be true.
4.3 Desire and disjunction
Now we discuss a possible concern for our approach involving disjunctions
in the scope of desire verbs. The issue can be brought out by considering
the contrast between (4a) and (15) in the Dinner scenario (repeated from
above):
Dinner : I’m meeting my friend for dinner. There are three
items on the menu: spaghetti bolognese, chicken, and lasagna.
I’m going to be late, so my friend—who has no idea about my
preferences—is going to order for me. Given my past experience,
I like the spaghetti most, I find the chicken to be good, and I
hate the lasagna.
(4a) I want spaghetti.
(15) # I want spaghetti or lasagna.
29It should be clear that similar effects can be obtained for other threshold values; we
just use 70 as an illustration.
30Another way of bringing out the concern here is through the following observation:
if you know that I want to go to Paris more than any other city, then you have enough
information to conclude that I want to go to Europe. In particular, you don’t need to
know anything about my preferences with respect to other European cities.
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Although (4a) is acceptable, (15) is not. A natural response to (15)
would be ‘But if you got the lasagna, you certainly wouldn’t like that’.
However, let us suppose that the relevant set of alternatives is A =
{spaghetti,chicken, lasagna}, with GA(Me) = {spaghetti,chicken}.
Then both (4a) and (15) are predicted to be true. In particular, spaghetti
entails I get spaghetti or lasagna, and this proposition is represented by A.
So, (15) is true. More generally, pS wants p or qq tends to suggest that S is
positively disposed towards both p and q, but our semantics doesn’t capture
this.31,32
In response, it is important to stress is that this “acceptability” inference
involving disjunction cannot stem from the meaning of the verb ‘want’. This
is because the relevant effect disappears in certain contexts, i.e. it is optional.
For instance, suppose I find out that my dining companion is a vegetarian,
and that both pasta dishes are meat-free. Then even if I know nothing
about my companion’s preferences but know that he is looking forward to his
meal, it is natural for me to say ‘He won’t eat chicken. He wants spaghetti or
lasagna’. Clearly, I am not claiming that my companion finds both spaghetti
and lasagna acceptable—he could well hate spaghetti. The effect is also
suspended when desire reports are embedded under quantifiers. Consider
(16) in the following scenario:
Function: Ten people are at a function with a set dinner menu.
One of three items will be served: spaghetti bolognese, chicken,
and lasagna. Five people love spaghetti, and hate lasagna; while
the other five love lasagna, and hate spaghetti.
(16) Everyone wants spaghetti or lasagna.
(16) is perfectly felicitous here. However, for no individual x does x find
both spaghetti and lasagna acceptable. Finally, the effect seems to go away
completely when the desire report appears in the scope of a variety of oper-
ators, for instance negation:
(17) I don’t want spaghetti or lasagna.
31Given our existential semantics for ‘want’, we could frame the effect as one where pS
wants p or qq suggests that both p and q are each entailed by good alternatives, and thus
that both pS wants pq and pS wants qq are true. But instead we have chosen to frame
the effect more neutrally so that it doesn’t presuppose the correctness of our account.
32It should be clear that this effect is tied to explicit disjunction. For instance, if I said
‘I want pasta’, you might ask which particular dish I’d like, but my utterance doesn’t
signal that getting either dish would be satisfactory. But ‘I get pasta’ and ‘I get spaghetti
or lasagna’ are contextually equivalent.
It is also worth noting that no analysis of desire that we are aware of explains this
effect. For instance, thresholdism predicts that (15) should be true so long as the utility
of getting spaghetti is high enough. But even in these contexts the report sounds bad.
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(17) is not compatible with me wanting spaghetti. But it would be if the
acceptability condition was present. For then (17) could be truly merely
because I find lasagna unacceptable (and thus fail to find both spaghetti
and lasagna acceptable).33 Summarizing: the particular inference to which
embedded disjunctions give rise can be suspended in certain environments.
However, if this effect was part of the standing meaning of ‘want’, we would
expect it to always be present. So, we would do well to leave off altering
our analysis of desire in response to examples such as (15).
Still, one might wonder why embedded disjunctions tend to give rise to the
observed effect. We won’t try to provide a complete answer to this question
here, though we will make some suggestive remarks. We find it plausible that
the acceptability inference is related to some other well-known phenomena
involving disjunction in the scope of modal expressions.34 More specifically,
consider disjunctions in the scope of deontics such as ‘may’ and ‘ought’:
(19) a. You may mail the letter. 6=⇒
b. You may mail the letter or burn it.
(20) a. You ought to mail the letter. 6=⇒
b. You ought to mail the letter or burn it.
It appears that (19a) does not imply (19b), since the latter seems to give
permission to burn the letter, but the former does not.35 And (20a) seems to
suggest that it permissible for you to burn the letter, which doesn’t follow
from (20b).36 What exactly is the best way to capture these effects is a
matter of healthy dispute, which we won’t attempt to adjudicate here.37
What’s more important for our purposes is that the similarity between these
33Similarly, the effect goes away under the modal ‘will’ as well as probability operators:
(18) a. He will want spaghetti or lasagna.
b. There is a chance that he wants spaghetti or lasagna.
Neither (18a) nor (18b) tends in general to suggest that my companion is positively
disposed to both spaghetti and lasagna.
34For a similar diagnosis of the behavior of disjunction under ‘want’, see (Crnič, 2011).
35The literature on this so-called “free choice” effect is vast. See among others (Kamp,
1974, 1978; Zimmermann, 2000; Kratzer & Shimoyama, 2002; Asher & Bonevac, 2005;
Geurts, 2005; Schulz, 2005; Simons, 2005; Alonso-Ovalle, 2006; Aloni, 2007; Fox, 2007;
Klinedinst, 2007; Ciardelli et al., 2009; Chemla, 2009; Barker, 2010; Franke, 2011; Aher,
2012; Roelofsen, 2013; Charlow, 2015; Fusco, 2015b; Starr, 2016; Willer, 2017; Romoli &
Santorio, 2017; Aloni, 2018).
36See, e.g. (Ross, 1941; Chierchia et al., 2009; Cariani, 2013; Fusco, 2015a) for discussion
of this effect.
37Some theorists have also tried to connect these effects featuring deontics to the theory
of scalar implicatures. We won’t attempt to survey this work, or the merits of these
approaches, but see, e.g. (Fox, 2007; von Fintel, 2012) for further discussion.
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effects and the acceptability inference exhibited by disjunctions under ‘want’
is striking.38 It raises the possibility that all of these phenomena could
have a common explanation. If that’s correct, then a promising first step in
theorizing about disjunction under ‘want’ will consider accounts of examples
such as (19)-(20).39
4.4 Internal negation
We end this section by considering an important challenge for the kind
of account we’ve been developing which comes from reports which feature
internal negation. To our ears, the ascriptions in (22) are infelicitous in the
Dinner scenario:
(22) a. # I want to not get spaghetti.
b. # I want to not get chicken.
Roughly put, the general pattern here is that it is unacceptable to re-
port a subject as wanting the explicit negation of a good outcome. But
our semantics predicts that these examples should be true relative to A =
{spaghetti,chicken, lasagna}, with GA(Me) = {spaghetti,chicken}.
For chicken is a good alternative which entails that I don’t get spaghetti.
Similarly, spaghetti is a good alternative which entails that I don’t get
chicken.
We think that this problem runs fairly deep in the sense that I get chicken
is to all intents and purposes equivalent to I don’t get pasta, and yet (23a)
is felicitous while (23b) is not:40
38Indeed, our observations concerning negation in (17) are inspired by well-known ob-
servations about the behavior of deontics under negation—see (Alonso-Ovalle, 2006; Starr,
2016; Romoli & Santorio, 2019) among others. For instance, (21a) is equivalent to (21b),
and not the weaker (21c):
(21) a. Mary may not read Ulysses or Madame Bovary.
b. = Mary may not read Ulysses and Mary may not read Madame Bovary
c. 6= Mary may not read Ulysses or Mary may not read Madame Bovary
39Blumberg & Goldstein (2021) already note that their theory of the behavior of dis-
junctions in the scope of deontics could have application to desire verbs. They explain
the relevant effects by positing an optional operator at logical form which checks that its
prejacent is neither entailed nor contradicted by its local context (Schlenker, 2009). Sup-
posing that the local context for the complement of ‘want’ is the union of the set of good
alternatives, and that the posited operator is sister to each disjunct in (15), one can show
that the report is true only if there is some good alternative that entails I get lasagna.
40Indeed, notice that on the natural way of choosing alternatives, for example A =
{spaghetti,chicken, lasagna}, the propositions I get chicken and I don’t get pasta are
true and false at exactly the same alternatives.
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(23) a. I want chicken.
b. # I want to not get pasta.
So, these data points involving internal negation seem to distinguish more
finely than traditional semantic frameworks allow.41,42
One possible response here is to maintain that internal, narrow-scope nega-
tion is interpreted wide-scope in these examples. For instance, the idea is
that (22a) has the following underlying form:
(26) ¬(I want spaghetti)
Our account predicts that (26) is false, which would explain its unacceptabil-
ity. However, at this stage it is rather unclear why seemingly narrow-scope
negation should be subject to this sort of movement. These issues merit
careful further exploration.
5 Conclusion
To summarize, we have tried to develop an account on which being best isn’t
necessary for being desired, which does not predict that abominable conjunc-
tions should be acceptable, and which also validates Weakening. We think
that our alternative-sensitive theory provides us with an elegant model of
these constraints, and more generally yields a promising approach to desire
that has the potential to account for a fairly wide range of phenomena.43
41Here is another way to bring out this point. Suppose that you desire both the vege-
tarian lasagna and the beef bolognese. Then (24a) seems true but (24b) does not:
(24) a. You want to get non-vegetarian food.
b. # You want to not get vegetarian food.
Or suppose that there are ten diners: all ten desire the vegetarian lasagna, while five of
them also desire the beef bolognese. Then (25a) is acceptable but (25b) is not:
(25) a. Five diners want to get non-vegetarian food.
b. # Five diners want to not get vegetarian food.
But to all intents and purposes, x gets non-vegetarian food is equivalent to x does not
get vegetarian food.
42This means that thresholdism also predicts that (23b) should be true, given any
context where the threshold is set so that (23a) comes out true. More generally, examples
featuring internal negation also pose a problem for thresholdism.
43Although the theory in (Phillips-Brown, 2021) isn’t alternative-sensitive, the account
in (Phillips-Brown, 2018) is. Just as we have suggested in this paper, Phillips-Brown (2018)
maintains that what is relevant for the evaluation of a desire ascription is the subject’s
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We’ll conclude by considering where we stand in the dialectic between
ordering-based accounts of desire on the one hand, and decision-theoretic ap-
proaches on the other. One can see Phillips-Brown as essentially arguing for
decision-theoretic analyses over ordering-based analyses on the grounds that
the former, but not the latter, can make sense of the fact that subjects can
desire that which isn’t best. But we have suggested that if one is careful, one
can develop an ordering-based theory that captures this fact. Moreover, our
sophisticated ordering-based account does better than its decision-theoretic
counterparts along several dimensions. So, although the phenomenon of
wanting what isn’t best moves us to revisit some of the assumptions that
tend to be made in formulating ordering-based theories (namely that subjec-
tive orderings range over worlds rather than coarser-grained entities such as
propositions), we think that the general ordering-based framework remains
in good standing. Of course, this is not to say that decision-theoretic con-
siderations play no role in the evaluation of desire reports—they do. But
their impact on the logico-semantic features of desire ascriptions is fairly
subtle, and is not reducible to a straightforward calculation of the expected
value of the prejacent.
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